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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
The legal problems of local governments appear in Louisiana appellate opinions with surprising frequency. To reduce this mass to manageable size for a survey treatment has required the use of several selection
principles: withholding comment on cases that were pending before the
supreme court at the time this article was being written,' bypassing
numerous opinions that essentially apply general legal principles to litigation involving local governmental units as parties, 2 avoiding issues more
appropriately addressed in the broader context of state administrative or
constitutional law, 3 ignoring cases that have limited significance,' and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Foster v. Hampton, 343 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 197
(La. 1977) (neither sheriff nor parish liable for negligent operation of motor vehicle
by deputy sheriff); Landry v. East Baton Rouge Parish, 343 So. 2d 207 (La. App.
1st Cir.), rev'd, 352 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977) (paving assessment invalid for lack of
evidence that each property owner was benefited to the extent of the assessment).
Because of the supreme court's review of Landry, this article also foregoes analysis
of the unappealed decision of the Third Circuit that raised a similar issue. See
Butaud v. City of Lake Charles, 338 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (paving
assessment of thirty-five dollars per frontage foot affirmed as within legislative
discretion of city council when appraiser estimated that all property owners were
benefited by an amount of at least twenty-eight dollars per frontage foot).
2. Many of the tort cases are of this genre. E.g., Taylor v. Broom, 345 So. 2d
1267 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (inmate fails to sustain burden of proof in action
against sheriff); Partin v. Vernon Parish School Bd., 343 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1977) (teacher not negligent in supervising playground); Picou v. Terrebonne
Parish Sheriff's Office, 343 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 345 So. 2d
506 (La. 1977) (police officer did not use excessive force in making arrest). Some
public contract cases are also of this type. E.g., Caddo Parish School Bd. v. Cotton
Baking Co., 342 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (bakery company liable for
damages resulting from failure to provide bread needs of school board).
3. Most of the challenges to dismissals of employees and other adverse personnel actions involve general questions of state administrative law. E.g., Wall v.
Community Improvement Agency, 343 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (unsatisfactory personnel rating upheld as supported by substantial evidence); Cook v.
Natchitoches Parish School Bd., 342 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 345
So. 2d 52 (La. 1977) (dismissal of tenured teacher upheld against challenges based
on procedural errors and lack of substantial evidence). Constitutional issues with
implications for state as well as local governments have frequently arisen in litigation with respect to the abolition of the defense of sovereign immunity. E.g.,
Wilder v. Thrower, 337 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (abolition of governmen-
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reserving discussion of decisions that raise issues that are too involved for
meaningful discussion in a survey format. 5 This article has then organized
the remaining opinions to reflect what appears to be a dominant theme of
the cases as a whole: the discordant nature of contemporary law relating to
local governments.
UTILITY SERVICES

Louisiana authorizes parishes and municipalities to own and operate
public utilities. 6 Two separate sections of the Revised Statutes expressly
tal immunity permits wrongful death action where the injury occurred before the
abolition of the defense and death occurred after abolition). For examples of other
constitutional issues that have only limited general significance, see note 4, infra.
4. E.g., Williamson v. Village of Baskin, 339 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976), writ refused, 341 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1977) (abolition in Constitution of 1974 of
village residency requirement for office of chief of police precluded village from
ousting incumbent after effective date of constitution even though incumbent had
failed to meet valid residency requirement prior to effective date); Rodriguez v.
City Civil Serv. Comm'n for New Orleans, 337 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976)
(abolition of veteran's civil service preference by the Constitution of 1974 required
commission to replace promotion list, in existence on effective date of constitution,
that reflected the preference); Graham v. Marshall, 333 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976) (board of aldermen rather than elected police chief had authority to fire police
officers under a statutory provision that has since been repealed); Butler v. Board
of Trustees of Elec. Workers Pension & Relief Fund, 333 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ refused, 337 So. 2d 515 (La. 1976) (statute governing pension fund for
electrical workers of the city of Monroe allows offset of workmen's compensation
benefits against disability retirement benefits).
5. The most recent chapters in the seemingly endless litigation over
Louisiana's local option statutes fall within this category. See Nomey v. Jackson
Parish Police Jury, 343 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Vernon Parish
Police Jury, 341 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 342 So. 2d 677 (La.
1977); Stewart v. Livingston Parish Police Jury, 340 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976). Although the local option cases raise issues of great practical significance,
the statutory intricacies and abundant jurisprudence suggest a lead article format as
a more appropriate forum for a discussion of this area.
6. See generally LA. R.S. 33:4161-4169 (1950). The statutory scheme permits
the ownership and operation of "revenue producing public utilities" and broadly
defines the terms as follows:
[A]ny revenue producing business or organization which regularly supplies the
public with a commodity or service, including electricity, gas, water, ice,
ferries, warehouses, docks, wharves, terminals, airports, transportation, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, drainage, sewerage, garbage disposal, and
other like services; or any project or undertaking, including public lands and
improvements thereon, owned and operated by a municipal corporation or
parish. . . . from the conduct and operation of which revenue can be derived.
LA. R.S. 33:4161 (1950). The 1974 constitution protects municipally-owned utilities
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permit these local governmental entities7 to provide utility services outside
their boundaries. One authorizes a municipal corporation or parish to "sell
and distribute the commodity or service of the public utility within or
without its corporate limits." 8 Another allows a municipality or parish
"operating a gas, water, or electric light system, sewerage plant, or
transportation system," to "extend such services to persons and business
organizations located outside its territorial bounds, or to any other parish
or municipality." 9 Two additional requirements limit this latter authorization. The extramural extension must be in accordance with the terms of a
service agreement between the government supplying the service and "the
persons, business organizations, parishes, or municipalities receiving the
service." 10 Moreover, no parish may extend utility services "into the
bounds of another parish without the consent of such parish," and no city,
town, or village may extend utility services "into another city, town, or
village without the consent thereof.""
In two recent cases, competing utility systems unsuccessfully attempted to imply additional limits on the power of municipalities to offer
services outside their corporate boundaries. Pointe Coupee Electric Corp.
v. Town of New Roads 2 involved a dispute between the private cooperative serving the unincorporated areas of Pointe Coupee Parish and the
municipal utility of the Town of New Roads. The cooperative sought to
restrain the town's municipal utility from initiating services in unincorporated areas of the parish that the cooperative was already serving. It
relied on a statutory prohibition forbidding a utility from furnishing electriin existence at the time of the effective date of the constitution from regulation by
the Public Service Commission. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(C).
7. The provisions authorizing the ownership of public utilities do not expressly define the term municipality. Presumably, they refer to the three classifications
of municipalities recognized by title 33: cities, towns, and villages. LA. R.S.
33:101(3)(1), 341 (1950); cf. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44(3). Other sections of title 33
define the term municipality more broadly. E.g., LA. R.S. 33:1321 (Supp. 1954)
(municipality includes cities, towns, villages, and "special districts . . . created to
perform one or more public functions or services").
8. LA. R.S. 33:4163 (1950).
9. Id. 33:1326 (1950). Note that this section covers a narrower category of
public utilities than does the other provision governing "revenue producing public
utilities." See note 6, supra.
10. LA. R.S. 33:1326 (1950).
11. Id. 33:1328 (1950). In addition, the fees charged by the municipalities for
service extensions must be "reasonable and non-discriminatory." Id. 33:1327
(1950).
12. 343 So. 2d 261 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ refused, 345 So. 2d 507 (La. 1977).
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city to any point that is served by an electric line of another electric utility
It
without securing the consent of the utility already serving the area."'
4
1
service.
extend
to
attempt
city's
the
barred
statute
this
argued that
The difficulty with the cooperative's argument was the inclusion of
the following proviso in the statutory prohibition: "The provisions of this
section shall not apply to any municipally-owned or operated utilities
...

-,"5The cooperative attempted to circumvent the proviso by argu-

ing "that a municipal utility operating outside of the municipality's boundaries is not municipally-owned within the meaning of the statute," but the
First Circuit properly rejected this contention as "without merit." 16 The
statutory authorizations for municipalities to provide utility services permit
service within or without corporate boundaries, and they give no indication that a municipal utility sheds its characteristic of municipal ownership
when it passes the corporate borders.
City of Houma v. Terrebonne ParishPoliceJury'7 presented a similar
conflict between a municipal utility and one owned by the parish. The
parish utility served all unincorporated areas of the parish, and when the
city sought to extend its gas lines to serve a subdivision in an area of the
parish outside its corporate boundaries, the parish sought to stop the
extension.' 8 The parish relied on the statutory requirement that the exten13. LA. R.S. 45:123 (Supp. 1970):
No electric public utility shall construct or extend its facilities, or furnish, or
offer to furnish electric service to any point of connection which at the time of
the proposed construction, extension, or service is being served by, or which is
not being served but is located within 300 feet of an electric line of another
electric public utility, except with the consent in writing of such other electric
public utility ....
The provisions of this section shall not apply to municipally-owned or
operated utilities of the State of Louisiana or to the parish of Orleans.
14. 343 So. 2d at 263.
15. LA. R.S. 45:123 (Supp. 1970). See note 13, supra.
16. 343 So. 2d at 263.
17. 345 So.2d 1206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
18. After the city agreed to provide gas service to the subdivision, the subdivider sought approval from the police jury. This approval was "necessary in order for
the developer to obtain Police Jury maintenance of the streets and drainage in [the]
subdivision." 345 So. 2d at 1207. At first, the parish refused to approve the
subdivision because the city had not sought parish permission to supply gas service
within the subdivision. Subsequently, the parish relented and approved the subdivision although it continued to insist that the city could not legally provide the service
without the consent of the police jury. The city then filed suit alleging that '[a]s a
result of this controversy, the City fears that the Police Jury will cut, tap, attach or
in some way connect its gas distributing system into the lines installed by the city in
[the subdivision]." Id.
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sion of a municipal utility system conform to a service agreement.' 9 It
contended that this requirement implicitly required the city to seek parish
approval before extending its gas lines into the unincorporated areas of the
parish. 2'
The First Circuit correctly rejected the parish's contention. Analysis
of the statutory language 2 indicates that the service agreement to which it
refers is between the municipal utility and the receiver of the utility
service. The extraterritorial service agreements of a municipal utility must
include the parish only if the parish is a receiver of the service.22 The
language affords no basis for a declaration that the parish into which utility
service is extended is a' necessary party to the agreement between the
municipal utility service and private parties who wish to receive municipal
service.
Although both decisions are defensible on analytic grounds, even the
First Circuit recognized that the results in the Houma case were questionable.23 The current statutes allow a parish or its franchisee to avoid
competitive invasion from another parish, 24 but provide them no protec25
tion against competitive inroads from a municipally-owned utility.
Conversely, a municipality can preclude another municipality from offer19. LA. R.S. 33:1326 (1950). See text at notes 9-11, supra.
20. 345 So. 2d at 1209.
21. Id. The statutory language is discussed in the text at notes 9-11, supra.
22. Since a parish that operates a utility can also serve areas outside the
parochial boundaries, LA. R.S. 33:1326, 4163 (1950), a parish could also be a party
to a service agreement as a supplier.
23. 345 So. 2d at 1209 (quoting opinion of trial court):
It may well be better public policy to limit the activity of a municipality
since competition between public bodies in a situation of this kind perhaps may
not be in the best interest of either public entity or the public who must
ultimately suffer the consequences of any damage or loss which may occur.
But public policy is not a matter which addresses itself to the court in a
controversy of this kind. Rather, it is a matter to be resolved by the legislature of
our state. The question of whether or not public bodies should compete or be
allowed to compete against each other in utility service is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the legislature and not to the court.. Apparently the
legislature has not seen fit to restrict the activities of the municipality since the
above cited statutory law satisfies this court that there is no such restriction
against the city expanding its utility lines into the parish domain, and the city
may do so without the consent or permission of the police jury. (Emphasis in
original).
24. LA. R.S. 33:1328 LA. (1950). Presumably, the parish could also withhold
consent to protect a franchisee as well as a utility it owned directly.
25. City of Houma v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 345 So. 2d 1206 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977); Pointe Coupee Elec. Corp. v. Town of New Roads, 343 So. 2d 261

1978]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977

ing services within its boundaries, 26 but apparently it cannot stop the
parish in which it is located from offering services within the municipal
boundaries.27 The rational policy that produces these inconsistent results is
difficult to discern, but the duplications in the statutes addressing the
problem of extraterritorial service28 suggest that the piecemeal development of the statutes may be an important reason for the lack of harmony
in the statutory scheme. Regardless of the causes, the situation calls for a
new legislative framework that applies a coherent policy to all problems of
extraterritorial service.
PUBLIC CONTRACTS

The Revised Statutes set forth rules applicable to public contracts in
chapter 10 of title 38.29 Section 2189 of the title establishes a special
prescription rule for suits against contractors or sureties "in connection
with the construction, alteration or repair of any public works let by the
state or any of its agencies, boards or subdivisions . ..",o
*. Prior to
September 12, 1975, the section established a three year prescriptive
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 345 So. 2d 507 (La. 1977). An issue left unanswered in the Houma decision is whether a parish could refuse to approve a
subdivision because it was using the services of a municipal utility. Terrebonne
Parish first adopted such a position but later relented voluntarily. See note 18,
supra.
26. LA. R.S. 33:1328 (1950). Presumably, the city could withhold its consent to
protect a franchisee as well as a utility it owned directly.
27. The only limit placed on a parish utility is that it may not enter the
boundaries of another parish without the consent of the parish. Thus, the same
analytical rationale that refused to imply additional limits on the expansive authority of municipalities would seem to permit a parish utility to offer services in
municipalities that are within its borders regardless of whether the municipality

consents.
Note, however, that only a parish-owned utility can invade the municipality. A
parish franchisee cannot serve areas within the municipality unless it obtains a
franchise from the municipality. Town of Coushatta v. Valley Elec. Membership
Corp., 139 So. 2d 822, 827 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). Moreover, if a municipality
annexes an area served by a parish franchisee, the franchisee may not serve new
customers in the annexed area without the permission of the municipality. See
Town of Kinder v. Beauregard Elec. Co-op., Inc., 339 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
28. Compare LA. R.S. 33:1326-1328 (1950) with id.33:4162-4163 (1950). See
text at notes 6-11, supra.
29. See generally LA. R.S. 38:2181-2301 (1950).
30. Id.38:2189 (Supp. 1975).
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period for such contracts; 3 1 the passage of Act 250 of 1975 has extended
the prescriptive period to five years. 32
In City of New Orleans v. Mark C. Smith & Sons, Inc. ,3 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held the section 2189 prescriptive period inapplicable to an action based on a contractor's failure to install sidewalks in a
New Orleans subdivision.34 The parties had stipulated that the contractor's
duty to construct the sidewalks was a contractual one. 35 However, the
contractor's bond indicated that the origin of this contractual duty was a
requirement imposed by the subdivision regulations of the New Orleans
36
City Planning Commission.
The court conceded that a contractor's agreement to construct sidewalks in exchange for approval of his subdivision plat constitutes a
contract . 37 Nonetheless, it held that this agreement was not a contract to
which section 2189 applied. Construing section 2189 in its statutory
context, the court ruled that it applied only to contracts "let" in accordance with chapter 10 of title 38.38 Since the other provisions of the chapter
did not apply to this contract, 39 the court held that the prescriptive period is

likewise inapplicable." 0
31. Id. (Supp. 1962) (as it appeared prior to 1975 amendment).
32. Id. (Supp. 1975).
33. 339 So. 2d 321 (La. 1976). The trial court had ruled that the statute establishing the prescriptive period was unconstitutional. Because of this ruling, the
defendants appealed directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court. See LA. CONST. art.
V, § 5(D)(1). The supreme court did not reach the constitutionality issue because of
its holding that the prescriptive period of section 2189 "does not apply to the type of
construction agreement here at issue." 339 So. 2d at 321.
34. The case involved the three year statute of limitations because the contract
was signed prior to the 1975 amendment of section 2189. 339 So. 2d at 322 n.1. See
text at notes 31-32, supra.
35. [T]he stipulation simply states that Smith "entered into a contract with the
City of New Orleans to perform sidewalk and street paving" in a named
subdivision. There was no stipulation with respect to the terms of this contract
other than that the work was to be performed within two years.
339 So. 2d at 321.
36. Id. at 322.
37. Id., citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 1761.
38. 339 So. 2d at 322.
39. Other sections of chapter 10 cover such matters as awarding the contract to
the lowest responsible bidder (LA. R.S. 38:2211 (Supp. 1977)), requiring security by
statutory bond (id. 38:2213 (Supp. 1958)), requiring registry of an acceptance (id.
38:2241.1 (Supp. 1964)), and permitting registry of notice of a contractor's default
(id. 38:2242 (Supp. 1966)).
40. The city first asserted the inapplicability of the prescriptive period in
section 2189 during oral argument on appeal. 339 So. 2d at 321-22. Thus the
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The supreme court's opinion merits commendation. A developer's
failure to comply with subdivision regulations raises different problems
than the failure of a contractor hired by a local government to finish the
work he has been hired to complete. For example, a city might be willing
to tolerate lengthy delays by a subdivider in the absence of substantial
sales in the subdivision in reliance on the anticipated completion of the
sidewalks. On the other hand, the city itself normally has an immediate
desire to complete sidewalk construction for which it directly contracts.
The supreme court was wise, therefore, to avoid engrafting the prescriptive period of section 2189 onto contracts that raise different problems
than it was designed to address.
Louisiana has also established special procedures governing the leasing of public lands. These provisions form chapter 10 of title 41 of the
Revised Statutes. 4' Section 1211 of the chapter indicates that the leasing
authority conferred by the chapter covers any "municipal or parochial
subdivision of this state, .

.

. or other unit or institution, deriving its

authority and powers from the sovereignty of the state. "42 Section 1212
authorizes these units to lease "for trapping, grazing, hunting, agricultural
and any other legitimate purposes whatsoever, . . . any lands of which
the lessor has title, custody or possession. , 43 Sections 1213 through 1215

establish bidding procedures applicable to these leases of governmental
land,' and section 1215 allows the governmental units to "accept only the
highest bid submitted but [they] shall have the right to reject all bids." 45
In State ex rel. Cuccia v. French Market Corp. ,46 the Fourth Circuit
considered the applicability of these provisions to a nonprofit corporation
created by the City of New Orleans to manage city property in the French
Quarter. The city authorized the corporation to lease its property in the
French Quarter, although the city had to approve all leases .4' The city
evidentiary record concerning the nature of the underlying obligation was extremely
sketchy. Consequently, the supreme court remanded the case to the district court
"for further proof of the nature of the contractual obligation secured by the
performance bond, as well as to permit the defendants to raise other defenses
available, if any, to this suit upon the performance bond." Id. at 323.
41. See generally LA. R.S. 41:1211-1294 (Supp. 1965 & 1977).
42. Id. 41:1211 (1950).

43. Id. 41:2112(A) (Supp. 1977). The section expressly excludes leases "for oil,
gas or other mineral purposes and development" from the scope of its coverage.
44. Id. 41:1213 (Supp. 1967), 1214 (Supp. 1972), 1215 (Supp. 1976).
45. Id. 41:1215 (Supp. 1967) (as it appeared prior to 1976 amendment). See text
at note 71, infra.
46. 334 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 337 So. 2d 189 (La. 1976).
47. Id. at 246-47.
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exempted the corporation from its ordinance requiring the awarding of city
contracts to the highest responsible bidder.48 Instead of merely trying to
maximize revenues, the corporation was to give great weight to maintain49
ing the integrity of the French Quarter tradition.
The corporation solicited bids in 1974 "to lease some 2600 square
feet of space in the French Market for a coffee and doughnut establishment. '"50 It received bids from two experienced New Orleans busi-

52
nessmen, Masson and Cuccia, 51 and Cuccia's bid offered the higher rent.

Notwithstanding the economic advantages of Cuccia's bid, the corporation
chose to lease the property to Masson, 53 and the city council approved the
lease.

54

The Fourth Circuit held the lease invalid for failure to comply with
the bid provisions applicable to leases of public lands. The court rejected

the corporation's argument that the statutory lease provisions were inapplicable because of the corporation's status as a private legal entity organized
pursuant to state statutes governing nonprofit corporations. It reasoned that
the concluding language of section 1211, which referred to any "unit or
institution, deriving its authority and powers from the sovereignty of the
state," 55 was broad enough to encompass the French Market Corporation.
The corporation, the court declared, "derived its authority from the City
to lease the property owned by the City which in turn derives authority and
56
powers from the state."
48. Id. at 247. See also Barreca v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 43, 50-53, 235
So. 2d 87, 89-90 (1970).
49. 334 So. 2d at 243; Barreca v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 43, 55-56, 235
So. 2d 87, 91 (1970).
50. 334 So. 2d at 243.
51. Although both men had business experience and solid financial backgrounds, the nature of their experience differed. "Masson is an acknowledged
expert restaurateur with 25 years of experience in the restaurant business, while
Cuccia is a successful candy manufacturer and merchant." 334 So. 2d at 244.
52. The rents were stated as flat fees plus percentages of gross sales, and the
corporation contested the issue of which bid offered the higher rent. Cuccia's bid
would produce higher rents unless gross revenues exceeded $1,125,000. Since gross
sales under the coffee house that had previously occupied the premises had never
exceeded $315,000, and those of a similar coffee house had never exceeded
$616,000, the court held that Cuccia's bid was higher. Id. at 244, 249.
53. Id. at 244. The court's opinion offers no explanation for the corporation's
choice of Masson. Perhaps one can best explain it by reference to Masson's
extensive experience in the restaurant business. See note 51, supra.
54. 334 So. 2d at 244.
55. LA. R.S. 41:1211 (1950). See text at note 42, supra.
56. 334 So. 2d at 246.
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The court also rejected the corporation's argument that the leasing
provisions applied only to leases of land and not "to the kind of enclosed
building space being leased in this case." 5 7 According to the court, the
corporation's distinction would lead to "absurd conclusions." For example, the statute would govern the lease of a parking lot but not the lease of
a parking building located on the same land.58
The court acknowledged the apparent inconsistency of its decision
with the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Barreca v. City of
New Orleans." In Barreca, the supreme court upheld a similar lease by
the corporation.' It denied a rejected bidder's demand that he be awarded
a lease and ruled that the corporation could consider other factors than
price in making its lease decisions. The court of appeal distinguished
Barreca because it concerned only the applicability of city bid ordinances
6
and did not raise the issue of the applicability of the state statute. '
The unfortunate result of the Fourth Circuit's decision is manifest. It
precluded the corporation from considering the very factor that is most
important to it: the ability of the lessee to establish a business that will
maintain the distinctive character of the city's French Quarter. The
Louisiana Supreme Court had recognized the validity of this factor in
Barreca:
The record before us, including the provisions of the proposed
leases, manifests the awareness of the officers of the Corporation of
the importance to the City and its citizens of the continued operation
and proper functioning of the French Market coffee stands. Their
Id.
58. Id. The court also noted that its decision on this point was consistent with
an earlier decision involving property of the City of New Orleans, Giles v. New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 306 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ
refused, 310 So. 2d 841 (La. 1976) (renewal of lease for concession in tennis
buildings covered by statutory provisions governing leases of public lands). Although the court conceded that "defendant's argument does not appear to have
been raised" in Giles, the court apparently took some comfort in reaching the
"same result" in both cases. 334 So. 2d at 246. The court's reliance on Giles is
difficult to understand since it distinguished the supreme court decision in Barreca
v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 43, 235 So. 2d 87 (1970), because the issue of the
applicability of the state bidding statute had not been litigated in that case. See
57.

notes 59-61, infra, and accompanying text.
59. 256 La. 43, 235 So. 2d 87 (1970).
60. Barreca also concerned the lease of space to be used for a coffee shop.
61. 334 So. 2d at 248. The court also stated that Barrecawas distinguishable on
its facts because it involved a lease to the existing proprietor of a going concern. It
did not explain why this factual distinction was legally significant.
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concern in leasing this particular property is not limited to receiving
as high a return as possible in renting, as is most often the principal
concern in leasing operations. . . . Also of prime importance...
is that the coffee shops continue to be operated without interruption
on a high standard and in a manner satisfactory and pleasing to its
62
citizens and the touring public.

One can appropriately criticize the opinion of the court of appeal for
not seeking a reasonable construction of the statute to avoid this unfortunate result.63 The court should have given more sympathetic consideration
to the corporation's claim that its leases were not among the types that the
legislature meant to cover in the statute. 64 The statutory examples convey

the distinct impression that the legislature was primarily aimed at leases
involving the uses of unimproved land rather than improved building
spaces. 65 Moreover, the court's reasons for reading the language to include the leases of the French Market Corporation do not justify its harsh
result. Although the court was certainly correct in stating that lands are
66
immovable and immovables include permanent structures on the land,

that statement falls far short of requiring a conclusion that legislative use
of the term "land" in a statute must include all structures that might be
classified as immovable. Similarly, the court's "absurd conclusions"
example is unpersuasive. 67 In fact, one might reasonably argue that the
application of the leasing provisions to govern a lease of a parking lot and
not of a parking garage is less absurd than the practical effect of the court's
own result. For in Cuccia, the court used leasing provisions designed for
62. Barreca v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 43, 55-56, 253 So. 2d 87, 91 (1970).
63. Contrast this approach with the supreme court's careful consideration of
the statutory context of the prescriptive period applicable to public contracts in City
of New Orleans v. Mark C. Smith & Sons, Inc., 339 So. 2d 321 (La. 1976). See notes
33-39, supra, and accompanying text.
64. Barreca seems to foreclose the corporation's other argument: that it was
not a lessor within the meaning of section 1211. Barreca expressly states that, in the
leases of French Market property, the corporation is merely acting as an agent for
the city. 256 La. at 51 n.5, 235 So. 2d at 90 n.5; id. at 60, 235 So. 2d at 93 (Barham,
J., concurring).

65. LA. R.S. 41:1212 (Supp. 1977) (examples of leases to which statute applies
are those "for trapping, grazing, hunting, [and) agricultural" purposes). Note also
the section's provision that a lease may be "on either a cash or share basis," a
reference that seems peculiarly applicable to agricultural leases. Cf. id. 41:1217
(Supp. 1977) (lessee who makes improvements "to the land" that are worth at least
$2000 receives preference for subsequent leases of land).
66. 334 So. 2d at 246.

67. Id.
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"trapping, grazing, hunting, [and] agricultural" purposes 68 to preclude
the City of New Orleans from leasing its business property with a view to
fulfilling a recognized public purpose; that is, to maintain the distinct
heritage of the French Quarter. 69 The court thus followed linguistic literalism to achieve a result that the statute never envisioned.70
Nonetheless, the real blame lies not with the court but with the
legislature. Once again, the lack of a unified approach to the legal
problems of local governments has forced the courts to apply statutes that
were not drafted with any significant concern for the problems of contemporary local governments. Fortunately, the particular mischief created by
68. LA. R.S. 4i:1212(A) (Supp. 1977); but cf. Hall v. Rosteet, 247 La. 45, 169
So. 2d 903 (1964) (provisions governing leases of public lands applicable to leases of
airport lands). In Hall, the supreme court refused to apply the maxim ejusdem
generis, which limits general words to classes or things of the same general kind as
those specifically mentioned, to the statutory provisions governing leases of land.
The court held the doctrine inapplicable because it found that the statutory language
manifested "a legislative intent to include all public land leases within the scope of
its general provisions." Id. at 59, 169 So. 2d at 908. Hall does not foreclose the
argument advanced above, however. In Hall, the court merely held that section
1212 applies to all leases of public lands. The court's opinion does not require a
conclusion that the term "lands" must be given the broadest possible definition.
69. Barreca v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 43, 55-56, 235 So. 2d 87, 91 (1970);
cf. LA. CONST. art VI, § 17 (local governments given authority to establish regulations for "land use, zoning, and historicpreservation, which authority is declared to
be a public purpose") (emphasis added).
70. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the dangers of an excessively literal approach to statutory construction. See, e.g., Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In Church of the Holy Trinity, the
Supreme Court held that a congressional ban against importing foreigners under
contract to perform labor in the United States was not applicable to a church's
contract with an English clergyman to come to America to serve as its rector and
pastor. The Court offered the following explanation for not giving effect to the
literal wording of the statute:
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of
the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute,
words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the
whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to [believe] that the legislator intended to include the
particular act .

. .

. The common sense of man approves the judgment men-

tioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted "that whoever
drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity," did not
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the
street in a fit.
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the decision in Cuccia was short-lived. Less than two months after the
court denied a petition for rehearing, the legislature passed (and the
governor signed) an amendment to section 1215 that was palpably designed to exempt the French Market Corporation from the coverage of the
statute. 71 However, this legislative tinkering with the specific difficulties
of the corporation should not obfuscate the underlying problem: the lack
of a comprehensive approach to the special contracting needs of local
governments.

72

TORT LIABILITY

Louisiana's abolition of the defense of sovereign immunity 73 has not
Id. at 459-61. Cf. Gremillion v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 186 La. 295, 301,172
So. 163, 165 (1937) ("[I]n order to give effect to the legislative intent, courts have
often found it necessary to give words the meaning the legislators intended rather
than their literal meaning."). In Gremillion, the court ruled that the word "corporation" included a natural person. See generally Frank, Words and Music: Some
Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947). The Civil
Code includes rules of construction both favoring and rejecting a strictly literal
approach. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 ("When a law is clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit."), with id. art. 18 ("The universal and most effective way of discovering the
true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious, is by considering the
reason and spirit of it, or the cause which induced the legislature to enact it."). As
Professor Llewellyn demonstrated over a quarter century ago, canons of construction often come in such pairs of opposites. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
71. 1976 La. Acts, No. 693, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 41:1215 (Supp. 1967).
72. A further indication of the impractical nature of the current provisions
governing the leasing of public lands is the list of special exceptions that the
legislature has engrafted to section 1212. See LA. R.S. 41:1212(B)-(E) (Supp. 1976).
The First Circuit has recently displayed a greater sensitivity to the contracting
needs of local governments. Sullivan v. City of Baton Rouge, 345 So. 2d 912 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977) (state highway specifications requiring bid performance bond to
be stated in "dollars and cents" inapplicable to road construction project that was a
joint effort of the city and a federal agency). Note that sensitivity to the contracting
needs of local governments does not require a court to ignore the legitimate
interests of those who contract with local governments. See Parish of East Baton
Rouge v. Industrial Enterprises, Inc., 340 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (no
valid contract existed between parish and paving contractor when parish mailed
contract ten months after receiving bids and nine months after contract award).
73. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. The Louisiana Supreme Court had abolished the
sovereign immunity defense prior to the adoption of the 1974 constitution. Board of
Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973) (state
boards and agencies are not immune from suit); cf. Hamilton v. City of Shreveport,
247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965) (statute authorizing the City of Shreveport to sue
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provided injured parties with a certain remedy for torts committed by
officers and employees of local governments. Recent decisions demonstrate that this question of vicarious liability is one of the major areas of
doctrinal disharmony in Louisiana local government law.
The most obvious problem is the inability of successful litigants to

force local governmental entities to pay judgments. In Foreman v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury,7 the Third Circuit held that a successful tort
plaintiff could not execute his judgment against any of the property owned
by a local government.7 5 Thus, -as a practical matter, Louisiana law

apparently leaves the judgment creditor at the mercy of the government
that is his debtor. 76 A recent casenote has explored the inequities of this
and be sued amounted to a legislative waiver of the local government's immunity
from tort liability); see generally F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE §§ 102, 105-06 in 12
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 137-38, 141-45 (1977). The defense of sovereign
immunity had long been subject to scholarly criticism. E.g., Borchard, Government
Responsibility in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Borchard,
Government Responsibility in Tort, VI (pt. 4), 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Fordham &
Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana, 3 LA. L. REV. 720
(1941); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.
REV. 476 (1953). Moreover, the Louisiana cases reflected a nationwide trend to
abolish the doctrine. See Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises
Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 25 (La. 1973); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa.
584, 608-09, 305 A.2d 877, 889 (1973).
From a historical standpoint, one can distinguish between sovereign immunity,
which applied to the state and its agencies, and governmental immunity, which
applied to most local governmental entities. See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215-16, 359 P.2d 457, 459, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (1961); Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 588-89" 305 A.2d 877, 879 (1973). The
distinction has no practical significance in contemporary Louisiana law because the
1974 constitution provides that "neither the state, a state agency, nor a political
subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability . . . for injury to person or
property." LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(A); cf. id. art. VI, § 44(1) (as used in article
VI, political subdivision includes "a parish, municipality, and any other unit of
local government").
74. 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 339 So. 2d 846 (La. 1976).
75. The court refused to follow those cases antedating the 1974 constitution
that had distinguished between property a local government held in a proprietary
capacity and property it held in a governmental capacity. 336 So. 2d at 989; see
generally A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY §§ 29, 30 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 77-86 (1966). In rejecting the contention that property held in a proprietary capacity was subject to seizure, the court relied on the statute providing that
judgments against political subdivisions "shall be paid only from funds appropriated for that purpose." 336 So. 2d at 989 (emphasis in original); see LA. R.S.
13:5109(B) (Supp. 1977).
76. The constitution requires the legislature to provide for the effect of judgments against governmental bodies. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10(C). Query whether,
in light of this mandatory language, a court would construe the current statutory
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result and the possible constitutional problems raised," so there is no need
for an extended analysis of Foreman here. However, the unconscionable
result permitted by Foreman is important as a reminder that any legislation
addressing the problem of the tort liability of local governments should
include provisions requiring the payment of judgments.
Other decisions of the past year illustrate the need for legislation with

respect to another aspect of the tort liability of local governments: clarifying what governmental unit is responsible for the conduct of specific
individuals. In Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce,7 8 the plaintiffs were the
widow and children of one Merlin Honeycutt. They alleged that the
marshal of the town of Boyce shot Honeycutt without provocation as the
marshal was serving an arrest warrant on him. They also alleged that the
marshal had previously threatened Honeycutt's life and that the mayor and
board of aldermen of Boyce knew of the marshal's misconduct and should
have relieved him of his duties.79
The district court sustained an exception of no cause of action filed by
the town.8 ° The court found that the marshal was an elected official who
was carrying out functions authorized by a state statute. Since the mayor
and board of aldermen of the town could not control the marshal's
provision regarding judgments as creating a ministerial duty, enforceable by writ of
mandamus, to pay judgments. There are two difficulties with such an argument.
First, the statutory language seems designed merely to restrict the source of
recovery, not impose a mandatory duty. See LA. R.S. 13:5109(B) (Supp. 1977)
("Any judgment rendered in any suit filed . . against a political subdivision...
shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose
by the . . . named political subdivision ....
"). Second, certain statements in the
constitutional convention debates on the section abolishing sovereign immunity
indicate an intention to leave the judgment creditor at the mercy of the governmental body. See STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS July 26, 1973, at 42, 51, 54-55; id., July 27, 1973, at 39; see
Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 982, 986 (1977).
77. Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 982 (1977); see also Foreman v. Vermillion Parish
Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986, 989-90 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (Miller, J., concurring).
78. 327 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 327
(La. 1976).
79. 341 So. 2d at 329.
80. 327 So. 2d at 157 (describing the rationale of the trial court):
As Jim Hillman was an elected official carrying out the functions authorized to
him by State Statute and no allegations of direction or control are presented in

the petition whereby the Town of Boyce whose duties and responsibilities are
likewise set out by Statute could have controlled the conduct of this elected
official, there are no properly pled facts whereby the Town of Boyce can be
held responsible for the general law enforcement duties of the elected marshal.
Consequently, the plaintiff's petition against the Town of Boyce does not state
a cause of action and the suit is dismissed at plaintiff's cost.
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conduct, the trial court held that the town was not liable for the marshal's
misconduct in performing his law enforcement duties.
The Third Circuit ruled that the district court should not have sustained the exception. 81 The court declared that the test was not whether the
town had control over the marshal's actions, 82 but "whether the employee83
was in the scope of his employment at the time the damage occurred."
Since the marshal was acting within the scope of his duties as an elected
town official at the time of the shooting, the town was liable, under a
theory of respondeat superior, for his misconduct.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision
on this point. 4 The supreme court, however, chose not to examine the
vicarious liability issue in any depth. Instead, the opinion simply summarized the holding of the court of appeal and declared that the result was
correct. 85
Cosenza v. Aetna Insurance Co. 86 concerned the liability of a parish

government for a tort committed by the clerk of a city court. Mr. and Mrs.
Consenza sued the City of Pineville8 7 for damages resulting from a
wrongful arrest authorized by the clerk of the City Court of Pineville and
carried out by members of the Pineville Police Department. The city then
81. 327 So. 2d at 157-58. Nonetheless, the court of appeal sustained the district

court's dismissal of the action. The appellate court held that the plaintiff's acceptance of a release executed by the marshal in his capacity as a parish deputy sheriff
also released him in his capacity as town marshal. Since the town was only
vicariously liable, the court reasoned that the release of the marshal released the
town as well, The supreme court reversed the decision of the lower courts on the
release issue. Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 341 So. 2d 327, 332 (La. 1976).
82. 327 So. 2d at 157-58. The court relied on cases limiting the applicability of
the Civil Code provision that "responsibility only attaches when the masters or
employers . . . might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have
not done it." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320.
83. 327 So. 2d at 158, citing LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974). The
court noted that this approach was consistent with article 2317 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[w]e are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by
our own act, but that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are
answerable ....
84. 341 So. 2d at 330.
85. Id. Most of the opinion concentrated on the release issue. See note 81,
supra.
86. 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
87. The court's opinion merely states that the action was "against several
parties, including . . . the City of Pineville." Id. Presumably, the other parties
included the clerk who issued the warrant and the police officers who executed it.
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filed a third party demand against Rapides Parish alleging that the parish
88
and the city were "joint employers or masters of the said City Court."
The trial court granted the parish's motion for summary judgment,
and the Third Circuit affirmed.89 The court's analysis rested on prior
decisions holding that the judge of a city court was a "state officer"' and
the statute providing that the city clerk was his employee. 9 Although the
court recognized that the parish paid part of the salaries of the judge and
the clerk,92 it declared that "the relationship between the Parish and the

Judge (and his clerk) terminates at that point.

-91

Consequently, "the

police jury of Rapides Parish or any other executive body at that level is
powerless to interfere with or direct the activities of the court. " 9 In
support of its conclusion that the city court was independent of parish
control, the court cited cases holding that a city council cannot abolish the
office of ward marshal by reducing its salary to a pittance 95 and that a
parish cannot interfere with the operations of the sheriff's department
96
within its boundaries.
Having decided that the parish exercises "no power or discretion in
the functioning of the City Court of Pineville," 97 the court then held that
88. Id. at 1305.
89. Id.
90. Id., citing Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So. 2d 92 (1952).
91. 341 So. 2d at 1305, citing LA. R.S. 13:1884 (Supp. 1977).
92. 341 So. 2d at 1305. See LA. R.S. 13:1888 (Supp. 1968) (salary of city clerk
paid inequal shares by the city and parish of the court's domicile).
93. 341 So. 2d at 1305.
94. Id. The rationale logically applies to exempt the City of Pineville from
liability as well. The Third Circuit expressly noted that "[t]he question of the City
of Pineville's liability or responsibility under the factual posture of this case isnot
before us at this time." Id. at 1305 n.l.
95. See State ex rel. Bass v. Mayor of Oakdale, 204 La. 940, 16 So. 2d 527
(1944). This case is, of course, distinguishable from the issue in Cosenza. Refusing
to permit a de facto abolition of the office re-enforces the legislative intent to
require a local government to have such an office. A similar approach with respect
to the issue of vicarious liability isjustified only ifthe same statutory provisions
manifest a legislative intent to protect local governments from liability for the torts
of these officials.
96. See Wood v. Maryland Cas. Co., 322 F.Supp. 436 (W.D.La. 1971); State
ex rel. Police Jury v.Davis, 120 La. 862, 45 So. 838 (1908); Nielson v.Jefferson
Parish Sheriff's Office, 242 So. 2d 91 (La.App.4th Cir. 1970). The applicability of
these cases to the situation of a clerk of a city court appears questionable. These
decisions reflect, at least inpart, the unique status of the sheriff as a separate fiscal
entity whose functions are prescribed by the state constitution. See LA. CONST.art.
V, § 27; id.art. VI, § 5(6); Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765, 839-43 (1977).
97. 341 So. 2d at 1306.
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the parish was not vicariously liable for any of the torts committed by
employees of the city court. The court then summarized its holding in the
following syllogism:
Simply stated, the City Judge is a state officer, and the'Clerk is his
employee. The Parish of Rapides is not an employer or master of the
City Court .

. .

. Ergo the Parish of Rapides is, under no theory,

responsible for the actions of the Judge of the City Court of Pineville
98
or those of his employees.
Considered together, Honeycutt and Cosenza fail to offer a sound
analytical approach to establishing governmental liability for torts
committed by state officers performing local governmental functions. In
Cosenza, the Third Circuit treated the status of state officer as determinative. It held that the clerk's status as a subordinate of a state officer over
whom the parish had no control relieved the parish of liability for the
clerk's torts. Honeycutt, however, bears the imprimatur of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, 99 and it held the town of Boyce liable for the town
marshal's torts. Since the marshal satisfies the Cosenza test for defining a
"state" officer," ° Honeycutt thus implicitly rejects the argument that a
local government entity cannot be liable for the torts of a state officer. ' 0'
98. Id.
99. See the text at notes 84-85, supra.
100. Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977)
("a 'state office' is one created by the Legislature or the Constitution"); cf. LA.
R.S. 42:1 (1950) ("A public office means any state, district, parish or municipal
office, elective or appointive . . . when the office or position is established by the
constitution or laws of this state.") (emphasis supplied). See id. 33:381 (1950), as
amended by 1970 La. Acts, No. 594, § 1 (statute creating position of town marshal);
LA. R.S. 33:423 (Supp. 1970) (statute prescribing duties of town marshal). After the
incident in Honeycutt, the Revised Statutes were amended to substitute "chief of
police" for "marshal" in section 381. 1975 La. Acts, No. 790, § 1. No similar
change was made in section 423, which still speaks in terms of the duties of the
marshal. LA. R.S. 33:423 (Supp. 1977). It is interesting to note that one of the cases
cited in Cosenza was a decision holding that a town could not lower the salary of a
city marshal to such low levels that the office would be abolished as a practical
matter. See note 95, supra, and accompanying text.
101. Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 327 So. 2d 154, 158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), revd
on other grounds, 341 So. 2d 327 (La. 1976):
It is clear that . . .[the marshal] was performing a duty incident to his
employment at the time he shot Honeycutt. Although the Marshal of the Town
of Boyce is an elected official . . .whose functions are provided by statute
• . .the answer of Marshal Hillman admits that, at the time of Honeycutt's
shooting, he was acting in his capacity as Marshal of the Town of Boyce, was
dressed in some of the paraphernalia of the Marshal of the Town of Boyce and
was serving a warrant of arrest as Marshal of the Town of Boyce.
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Moreover, it explicitly rejects the notion that liability should depend on the
amount of control that the local government unit exercises over the
officer. 102
Honeycutt appears to offer the better approach to the problem of
vicarious liability because it requires that some local governmental entity
respond for all damages committed by officers in the official performance
of the responsibilities of local governments.' 03 Unfortunately, there is no
clear indication whether the Louisiana courts will follow Honeycutt or
Cosenza in deciding on vicarious liability for the remainder of the host of
state officers who serve local governments." Once again, the basic need
is less for piecemeal judicial patchwork than for a comprehensive legislative articulation of the principles that should govern the vicarious liability
05
of local governments. 1
CONCLUSION

The decisions analyzed in this article reveal unfortunate gaps in the
law applicable to Louisiana's local governments. Not all areas of local
government law have produced recent decisions in irreconcilable conflict
102. Id. ("The test for vicarious liability

. . .

is not whether the employer could

have controlled or prevented the act causing the damage but whether the employee
was in the scope of his employment at the time the damage occurred.").
103. The logical result of the Cosenza reasoning would be to hold that neither
the City of Pineville nor Rapides Parish is responsible for the torts of the clerk of
the city court. See note 94, supra. Query whether the state would be liable since the
clerk is a state officer and not a local officer? A supreme court opinion issued after
the preparation of this article indicates in dictum that the answer would be yes. See
Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197, 202 n.7 (La. 1977).

Of course, there may be functional reasons for distinguishing between judicial
officers and other state officials who serve local governments. The point in the text
is simply that Cosenza provides no rationale for such a distinction.
104. E.g., LA. R.S. 33:383 (Supp. 1970) (municipal officers under MayorAlderman system include mayor, alderman, chief of police, tax collector, clerk, and
street commissioner); id. 33:521 (Supp. 1958) (municipal officers under commission
plan include mayor and councilmen); id. 33:1551-1567 (Supp. 1977) (duties of parish
coroner).
105. A third area in which Louisiana is confused is the question of what types of
actions by local government officers and employees will subject the local government to liability. See, e.g., Dufrene v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ refused, 343 So. 2d 1069 (La. 1977) (negligent inspection of private business
would not render city liable to patrons subsequently injured in a fire at the establishment); Foster v. Hampton, 343 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 352 So. 2d 197
(La. 1977) (neither sheriff nor parish that sheriff serves is liable for damages caused
by deputy's negligent operation of motor vehicle); Evans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340
So. 2d 634 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (city liable for failure to enforce weed ordinance
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or decisions with absurd practical consequences, 1°6 but the phenomenon

seems relatively common, and underlines the need for the legislature to
adopt a comprehensive, functional approach to the legal problems facing
local governments.

The reason behind the discord in the area is primarily historical.
Local government law is a relatively new "field" of law. Traditionally,
the law relating to local governments has developed as distinctive bodies
of law applicable to particular offices or types of local government. In
recent years, however, scholars have increasingly recognized the need for
a more integrated approach that emphasizes the functional problems faced
by local government units regardless of the particular form of government. 107
when failure caused automobile accident that injured plaintiff). Compare Frank v.
Pitre, 341 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd, 353 So. 2d 1293.(La. 1977)
(sheriff liable for damages caused by prisoner that was allowed to leave custody),
with Fusilier v. Russell, 345 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 347 So. 2d
261 (La. 1977) (neither sheriff nor deputies liable for damages caused by failure to
arrest intoxicated individual who later was responsible for automobile accident); see
also Comment, Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection, 23 Loy. L. REv. 458
(1977). Obviously any attempt to provide a statutory solution tothe problems of tort
liability of local governments should also address this problem. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (1970) (Federal Tort Claims Act preservation of immunity with respect to
discretionary functions); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also
Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
919, 923:
[U]nlike the private entrepreneur, the public officer is ordinarily not free to
terminate an unduly risky enterprise. Considerations of this sort suggest that
governmental tort liability, considered as a whole, may tend to develop rationally grounded functional distinctions quite different from those which characterize private tort liability systems. (Footnotes omitted).
106. For example, recent zoning decisions have generally applied a reasonable
and consistent approach to zoning problems facing local governments. E.g., Southside Civic Ass'n v. Guaranty Sav. Assur. Co., 339 So. 2d 323 (La. 1976) (party
attacking zoning ordinance failed to rebut presumption that local government provided adequate notice); Tucker v. City Council for New Orleans, 343 So. 2d 396
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 345 So. 2d 56 (La. 1977) (city council has authority
to reverse decision of historic zoning commission that it established); City of
Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 344 So. 2d 670
(La. 1977) (zoning regulation proscribing trailers applies to a mobile home that has
been placed on concrete blocks and had its wheels removed); Hargroder v. City of
Eunice, 341 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 344 So. 2d 378 (La.
1977) (building restrictions limiting property to residential uses applicable to property rezoned into commercial district); Cook v. Metropolitan Shreveport Bd. of
Appeals, 339 So. 2d 1225 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La.
1977) (telephone properly granted a special exception use for its telephone exchange
facility).
107.

See, e.g., J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1975); W. VALENTINE,
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The Constitution of 1974 lays the framework for such a functional
approach to local government law in Louisiana by authorizing broad
grants of power to various types of local governments. 0 8 Unfortunately,
the legislature has not reorganized the statutory provisions relating to local
government in a similar fashion. By building on the foundation laid by the
new constitution, the legislature could promote increased certainty about
the law and greater local authority to handle contemporary problems. Until
the legislature acts, the contributions of the courts to these goals will be
limited. Although they can and should interpret existing statutes with an
eye to their practical effect," they should not ignore or rewrite statutory
language. " 0 Moreover, they cannot create a unified system from a statutory maze of overlapping and imprecise statutes.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1975); cf. F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS (1970); S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1977).
108. See LA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5, 7, 20.

109. See notes 29-72, supra, and accompanying text.
110. See notes 6-28, supra, and accompanying text.

